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Philosophical Excursus II
Rorty and Lyotard, 
or about conversation and tragedy
1.
There are many more and less important points of discord 
between Rorty and Lyotard, there are many differences of 
fundamental importance for the two philosophers.1 (Lyotard 
speaks precisely of a "radical divergence" between them1 2 3). One 
could write a lot about their different attitude towards utopia, liberal 
democracy, shape, place and role of philosophy in future culture, 
towards painting and literature, history of philosophy, the man/his 
work distinction2, different account of the role of particular great 
philosophers in recent history of philosophy (of Kant in particular) 
etc. etc. What we are interested here in, though, is mainly one 
problem and one difference revealing itself through Rortyan 
disagreement with the Lyotardian idea of "différends". In the 
statement that the task of philosophy is to "bear witness to 
différends" (to maintain them and to search for new idioms coined 
especially for the purpose of expressing them rather than turning 
them into mere litigations) on Lyotard’s part -  and, on the other 
hand, in questioning of any positive role of différends in culture on
1 I wrote about them in more detail in my Polish book already referred to, 
Rorty and Lyotard. In the Labyrinths of Postmodernity, e.g. in the chapter "The 
Sign of History (Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault)".
2 Jean-François Lyotard, "An Interview" (with Reijen and Veerman), Theory, 
Culture and Society, vol. 5 (1988), p. 304.
3 For instance, on the occasion of the so-called "Heidegger affair". See 
Lyotard’s Heidegger et 'les juifs’ from the Vienna conference (Wien: Pasagen 
Verlag, 1990) as well as his book Heidegger and 'the jews’ (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota UP, 1991), and, on the other hand, Rorty’s dismissive remarks from 
a review of Farias’ book on Heidegger ("Taking Philosophy Seriously") as well 
as from notes to CIS and PP 2 such as the following: "On the general question 
of the relation between Heidegger’s thought and Nazism, I am not persuaded 
that is much to be said except that one of the century’s most original thinkers 
happened to be a pretty nasty character (CIS, p. 11, n. 11) -  emphasis mine.
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Rorty’s part, there is probably the crucial difference between them. 
Let us say by virtue of an Introduction the following: if Lyotard says 
in a discussion with Rorty that "il y a entre Richard Rorty et moi un 
différend"4, then the point is undoubtedly worth being discussed.
Within the "différend" between Lyotard and Rorty (which within 
detailed discussions in The Différend. Phrases in Dispute of the 
former seems to be too strong a word, the one characterized by 
emotions of the ongoing controversy between them), I will confine 
myself to tracing why Rorty does not recognize différends as such, 
that is to say, to just a part of a larger "différend" between them, 
but potentially a very important part. For it seems to me that in his 
inacceptance of différends there is also the pragmatic 
inacceptance of tragedy (and let us remind here a brief, 
never-developed remark made by Richard Bernstein: "Rorty’s 
liberal culture seems to be a world in which there is no place for 
tragedy"5). In a pragmaticized world of liberal democracy with a 
constant, unchangeable, radical and ahistorical separation 
between the private and the public, there is no place for the tragedy 
of obligations and duties, the drama of radically different 
obligations, the tragic choice between one good and another good, 
each of which is precisely a good rather than a good and an evil.
I am discussing the point in more detail in chapters devoted to 
Rorty’s Derrida and about philosophy and politics, let me just try 
to show here what might possibly mean Lyotard’s memorable 
words that his own "genre de discourse" is tragic, while that of 
Rorty -  is conversational.6 The "différend" between tragedy and 
conversation is unavoidable (and therefore Lyotard rhetorically 
asks about the tribunal which would be able to say which of the 
two "genres de discours est le plus juste"7). Let us turn it in this
4 Jean-François Lyotard in: "Discussion entre Jean-François Lyotard et 
Richard Rorty", Critique456, mai 1985 (Ed. Vincent Descombes, "La Traversée 
de l’Atlantique"), p. 581.
5 Richard Bernstein, "Rorty's Liberal Utopia" in New Constellations 
(Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1989), p. 287.
6 Jean-François Lyotard, "Discussion entre Jean-François Lyotard et 
Richard Rorty", p. 581.
7 Ibidem, p. 581.
book into one of many perspectives serving to show "European 
connections" of neopragmatism.
Let us first listen to Rorty from an answer given to Lyotard’s text 
(both texts were pronounced in 1984 at Johns Hopkins University 
and then published):
In a very interesting and enlightening synthesis of 
philosophical and political problems, Lyotard suggests 
that we can see everythingUom the semantic paradoxes 
of self-reference to anticolonialist struggles in terms of 
these contrasts [i.e. between "différend" and "litigation" 
as well as between "damage" and "wrong" -  MK]. Using 
this vocabulary, Lyotard’s doubts about universal history 
can be put by saying that the liberal-pragmatist attempt 
to see history as the triumph of persuasion over force 
tries to treat history as a long process of litigation, rather 
than a sequence of différends. My general reply to these 
doubts is to say that political liberalism amounts to the 
suggestion that we try to substitute litigation for 
différends as far as we can, and that there is no a priori 
philosophical reason why this attempt must fail, just as 
{pace Christianity, Kant, and Marx) there is no a priori 
reason why it must succeed.8
Let us comment briefly on this passage which contains perhaps 
the very essence of the discord between Rorty and Lyotard 
discussed here. Rorty tries to turn Lyotard into a kind of old 
structuralist who imposes on the complicated reality his own grid 
of two oppositional concepts ("differend'V'litigation") and thinks 
that he knows answers to all questions ("from the semantic 
paradoxes of self-reference to anticolonialist struggles"). He 
associates Lyotard’s philosophical project with politics (by clear 
biographical reference to Algeria) and writes about the "synthesis 
of philosophical and political problems" to show that Lyotard is a 
kind of totalist who, which Rorty mentions a bit later in the text -
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8 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Reply to 
Lyotard" in PP 1, p. 217 -  emphasis mine.
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horrible dictu! -  makes use of forbidden, "suspiciously Kantian" 
terminology, who thinks about philosophical investigations in bad, 
Kantian, juridical metaphors... Thus Lyotard in Rorty’s reading -  
does not separate philosophy from politics, the first fault; he still 
thinks in the Kantian way, the second fault, especially considering 
notoriously negative role played by Kant in all his books, from 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature to Consequences of 
Pragmatism to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Kant as a 
founder of the idea of philosophy as a super-science -  
epistemology; Kant opposed to Hegel; Kant opposed to Freud). 
And finally, Lyotard in Rorty’s view separates himself from 
reformist, pragmatist liberals -  allying with revolutionary 
philosophers interested only in "radical criticism"9 The point is to 
transform différends into litigations and solve them rather than 
merely show existing différends. The replacement of force with 
persuasion and différends with litigations is, according to Rorty, a 
key to a future free from cruelty. As he says:
The history of humanity will be a universal history just in 
proportion to the amount of free consensus among 
human beings which is attained -  that is, in proportion to 
the replacement of force by persuasion, of différends by 
litigations.10
Lyotard has to oppose this, for he cannot accept the equation 
between persuasion and convincing (one thing is persuader, 
another thing is convaincre). Persuasion is a rhetorical procedure, 
making use of strategies of rhetoric and dialectic. It is a mental 
violence. And thus how can one achieve, starting from /a violence 
mentale (of which Lyotard says in his discussion with Rorty), the 
consensus sought by Rorty? How is one to unite achieving a free, 
unrestricted consensus -  with the use of persuasion and rhetorical 
tricks? How is one to unite a free choice with an imposed 
redescription? What comes to mind here is Rorty’s remark from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that redescription often
9 Ibidem, p. 221.
10 Ibidem, p. 218.
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humiliates... Persuasion in Lyotard’s view is force and cannot lead 
to a free consensus. Lyotard asks Rorty the following:
How a consensus can be free if it was achieved with the 
help of persuasion? I think that the whole question of 
imperialism, including mild one -  the question of what I 
would label Rorty’s conversational imperialism - is  right 
here.11
One could add -  mild, conversational imperialism can easily 
lead to a monologue, especially when the only remarkable voice 
in a conversation is the voice of a liberal democrat... And it is very 
wise of Rorty to lead a discussion in his answer to Lyotard’s text 
towards, finally, as he puts it in the last sentence, "our different 
notions of how politically conscious intellectuals should spend their 
time".1 2 For the question whether one should be a witness, 
whether one should "bear witness" (to differends, truth, the past) 
- a  foposcommontomoralists, novelists, poets, to refer to Orwell, 
Milosz or Zbigniew Herbert -  is a question about the intellectuals’ 
self-image. Edward Said, undoubtedly a "committed intellectual", 
in his 1993 Reith Lectures asks "the basic question for the 
intellectual: how does one speak the truth? What truth? For whom 
and where?"13, and answers somehow with the title of one of his 
lectures -  "Speaking the Truth to Power". That "speaking the truth 
to power" in a country with strong reformist traditions is doomed 
to marginalization (hence unheard-of aversion of high-circulation 
papers like "New York Times" or "Newsweek" to radical theories 
put forward by Derrida, Foucault, Baudriilard or their followers, 
manifested strongly, for instance, during the so-called "de Man 
affair" in the end of the eighties). The situation in France is 
different, this can become there almost an institution in the way it 
was in the times of Zola, Sartre and even -  functionally at least -
11 Jean-François Lyotard, "Discussion entre Jean-Francois Lyotard et 
Richard Rorty", p. 582.
12 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Reply to 
Lyotard" in PP 1, p. 222.
13 Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (London: Vintage), 1994, 
p. 65.
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Foucault. As Bernard-Henri Lévy wrote about the (French) 
intellectual: "He has and must have betrayal in his blood". 
Reformism or revolution, lifting spirits through utopian fantasies, 
as Rorty wants -  for "We Deweyans have a story to tell about the 
progress of our species, a story whose later episodes emphasize 
how things have been getting better in the West during the last few 
centuries, and which concludes with some suggestions about how 
they might become better still in the next few"14 -  o r , on the other 
hand, bearing witness to "the unbearable", or "resistance through 
writing", as Lyotard wants. The difference between them is the 
difference in seeing their own tasks, different traditions, different 
obligations. Perhaps in broader terms -  looking towards the future 
on the part of neopragmatism (and "hopes" put in a liberal "utopia" 
associated with it) and Lyotard’s inclination against the past, 
against (any, even liberal) utopia and utopianism, fearing violence 
and totalitarianism which in America may sound strange and 
incomprehensible (for it is a "future-oriented country", as Rorty 
says). French philosophers are haunted by specters of the bloody 
past, more and less distant, mémoire du crime, which Lyotard 
merely mentions in his discussion with Rorty. Philosophy, 
literature, politics in France still remember the regicide of 1792, 
"we cannot fail to remember that this crime was horrible".15 
American philosophers are rather not haunted by anything with a 
similar degree of intensity. To close that theme with one sentence 
- the French look with fear to the past and think what to do so that 
the past never returned; the American look forward and are bold 
in inventing social utopias. The difference in attitude between them 
is clearly shown in Rorty’s remark made on the margin of 
Lyotardian considerations of "signs of history" and défaillance of 
modernity:
From our standpoint, nothing could refute that doctrine 
[the doctrine of parliamentary liberalism -  MK] except 
some better idea about how to organize society. No
14 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation", in PP 1, p. 212.
15 Jean-François Lyotard, "Discussion entre Jean-Francois Lyotard et 
Richard Rorty", p. 583.
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event -  not even Auschwitz -  can show that we should 
cease to work for a given utopia. Only another, more 
persuasive, utopia, can do that.16
It is a philosophical creed rather impossible to be maintained 
from the perspective of European experiences, and this is testified 
by philosophical and intellectual controversies accompanying the 
Historikerstreit in Germany, /’affaire Heidegger in France or 
violent polemics surrounding the revisions of history suggested by 
Robert Faurisson (in which Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Vidal-Naquet and others were engaged). In Europe, since 1789, 
there were so many tragic events that it is becoming more and 
more difficult to look with hope to the future in the form of a utopia.17 
It is not to say that America has been just a land of happiness at 
that time, there is much to be said about that as well.
Rorty explains his differences with French philosophers in a still 
different way: "Like Lyotard, we want to drop meianarratives. 
Unlike him, we keep on spinning edifying first-order narratives".18 
And what is important in this sentence is not only -  visible at first 
sight -  opposition between narratives and metanarratives but also 
that of mere narratives and edifying narratives. Lyotard -  and other 
postmodern French philosophers -  do not construct edifying 
narratives for they do not believe as strongly as Rorty in liberal 
democracy.19 What worries Rorty? "Their [French -  MK]
16 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation" in PP 1, p. 220 - 
emphasis mine.
17 Zygmunt Bauman asks in the context of the collapse of communism - how 
"to live without an alternative?". See Intimations of Postmodernity (London: 
Routledge, 1992).
18 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation", PP 1, p. 212.
19 Lyotard advises Rorty to "revise his too great trust put in democracy, even 
liberal democracy" ("Discussion", p. 583). Perhaps it might be interesting to show 
a more, so to speak, philological theme, although the one full of philosophical 
consequences. In the original version of Rorty’s text "Cosmopolitanism without 
Emancipation", the opening sentence is the following: "In the form John Dewey 
gave it, pragmatism is designed to be a philosophical apology for political 
liberalism -  a way of making social democratic politics look good'. The French 
translator from Critique (where the text was first published) performed some 
revisions in the first part of the sentence emphasized by me, and he did not 
understand the second part of it, perhaps being unaware that for Rorty the most
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antiutopianism, their apparent loss of faith in liberal democracy"20 
Edifying narratives cannot be built by someone who is antiutopian, 
but nor can they be built by someone who would see the history 
of recent centuries as a sequence of (unsolvable) differends rather 
than a sequence of (always solvable) litigations. Rorty cannot 
accept Lyotard’s account of history -  his "signs" in the form of 
"Auschwitz" or "May ’68" -  as long as he wants to present it as a 
permanent, pragmatist progress in the history of humankind; 
although chance and contingent, nevertheless the one leading in 
a good direction (and therefore, as Rorty explains in his response 
to Thomas McCarthy, "we do not need more theory" for the most 
important conceptual theory has already taken place -  and has 
given us the vocabulary of liberal democracy). Philosophy has to 
give way here to (liberal) democracy. If Rorty accepted the 
differend-related account of history, he would lack a moral belief 
necessary, as it seems, for building edifying stories about the 
present and constructing utopian visions of the future. Rorty’s 
pragmatism cannot accept the differend, it has to maintain the 
private/public split, has to "drop the revolutionary rhetoric of 
emancipation and unmasking in favor of a reformist rhetoric about 
increased tolerance and decreased suffering".21 For Lyotard this 
is just rhetoric, precisely the rhetoric that gives us pistis rather than 
logic that gives us episteme.
Referring to the Rortyan metaphor of language islands on which 
Frenchmen should invite other philosophers rather than build 
connections between them and the mainland, Lyotard responds
important strategy is redescription: thus what was left was "le pragmatisme 
est une sorte de défense philosophique du libéralisme politique -  une manière 
de rendre acceptable la politique social démocrate". And, finally, here is the final 
English version of the passage from Philosophical Papers'. "... pragmatism is a 
philosophy tailored to the needs of political liberalism, a way of making political 
liberalism look good to persons with philosophical tastes". The metamorphoses 
of a single sentence show the whole range of standpoints in the debate on 
relations between philosophy and (liberal) politics. See "Cosmopolitanism 
without Emancipation", p. 1 (a manuscript), "Le Cosmopolitisme sans 
Emancipation", Critique, op. cit., p. 569, "Cosmopolitanism without 
Emancipation" in PP 1, p. 211 (emphasis mine)
20 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation", in PP 1, p. 220.
21 Ibidem, p. 213.
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in his recent Moralitéspostmodernes that "guarding our [= French
-  MK] archipelagos seems to be a wiser attitude". The mainland 
is not desirable because it is occupied by l ’Empire de la 
méta-conversation (which unmistakably directs our attention 
towards Lyotard’s discussions from Le Mur du Pacifique devoted 
to American Empire and its European provinces), the empire -  
among other things -  of Rortyan metaconversation -  which does 
not notice heterogeneity and incommensurability of various 
genres of discourse -  e.g. ethics, aesthetics, politics, knowing. 
"Conversational" Rorty and "tragic" Lyotard speak radically 
different languages, there is no tribunal to judge which way of 
thinking is more just (and that is Lyotard’s perspective in his 
discussion with Rorty). According to Lyotard, there is a différend 
between them. Rorty cannot accept différends as the very idea of 
a différend cannot find its place in pragmatic account of practising 
philosophy in which the most important features are persuasion 
and rhetoric. It is important to bear this in mind reading another 
"context” of Rorty’s philosophy in its European entanglements. 
Reading Lyotard and his thinking about the différend (which is 
tragique in his own words), it is worth while thinking about Rorty 
and his permanent doubts. As in any différend (if it really were to 
be one), the choice is only in an idiom of one of the two sides. It is 
worth while tracing -  in the manner of thinking through the relations 
between the aforementioned mainland and surrounding islands -  
what remains out of the constellation of possible questions asked 
in neopragmatism. So let us listen to Lyotard for a moment, 
remembering about Rorty’s connections. Let us start in a very 
general way.
2.
One can get the impression that the postmodern thought -  
together with the whole world of postmodernity that surrounds us
-  has been stripped of the tragic, being "flattened" or 2
22 Jean-François Lyotard, Moralités postmodernes, "Un partenaire bizarre" 
(Paris: Galilée, 1993), pp. 130, 130.
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"de-dramatized" . Postmodernists are often reproached for 
depriving their world of insoluble conflicts, of contradictions, for 
making it simple and comprehensible. (Richard Rorty may serve 
as a paradigmatic object of criticism that goes along these lines, 
perhaps not without some reason). The tragic is supposed to have 
disappeared from philosophy together with the arrival of the 
existentialist absurd and to have never come back, the world is 
supposed to have lost for ever its apocalyptic dimension... And yet, 
despite diagnoses and enunciations critical to postmodernism, 
one can show such points in postmodern reflection in which there 
may be the (irreducible) tragic, whose dramatics strikes as if the 
world had not been totally disenchanted of katharsis yet... Let us 
consider in virtue of an example the philosophical thought of 
Jean-François Lyotard.
In order to be able to discuss the possibility of "the tragic" in 
today’s world, let me do two things at the same time in the present 
part of the excursus: first, I would like to present briefly the 
Lyotardian project of the différend {le différend) presented in his 
most significant -  as he admits himself -  philosophical work, 
entitled precisely Le Différend and, second, I would like to present 
a particular application of the project to a more than literary conflict 
of two reasons from Antigone (that of Antigone and of Creon, 
obviously). The task seems not to be easy and requires division 
of one’s attention between two parallel planes of argumentation 
as well as some prudence because Lyotard does not provide any 
typical tools for analysis, not to mention a ready-to-use "method". 23
23 The impression of ''de-dramatization” of the world is especially evident 
while reading the texts of Baudrillard and Bauman. In Budrillardian la société de 
consommation the citizen -  i.e. primarily the consumer -  is subjected to 
"constraint" of happiness and pleasure. He simply, as Baudrillard says, "has no 
right not to be happy", otherwise he becomes "asocial" (Jean Baudrillard, 
Selected Writings, ed. M. Poster, Oxford: Polity Press, 1988, p.48). In Bauman’s 
postmodern world there is no determination -  nor chance or contingency, the 
world of games "offers neither certainty nor despair; only the joy of a right move 
and the grief of a failed one" (Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other 
Life Strategies, Oxford: Polity Press, 1992, p.187). The world of games and 
moves, without contingency -  thus without responsibility and ethical choices -  
is the world that we cannot see around us and, besides, it is in our view the world 
of deadly boredom...
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The present piece has been born out of the search of a 
non-philosophical exemplification of a philosophical proposal in 
question that I strongly lacked in Lyotard’s writings. I have the 
impression that mutual -  and simultaneous -  illumination and 
interpenetration of both -  literary and philosophical -  threads might 
lead to better elucidation of philosophical content of the Lyotardian 
oeuvre. That will be, let us admit contritely at the very beginning, 
a work of the Lévi-Straussian bricoleur, a philosophical tinker who 
unites discourses of (Greek) literature and (postmodern, as well 
as Hegelian) philosophy, mixes together different epochs, crosses 
borders of cultures and genres. One could question the legitimacy 
of such collage-like procedures but we think them to be justified 
by the conviction that what is at stake is not one truth about 
Sophocles or about Hegel (nor that of Antigone or Socrates) as -  
within today’s horizon- there are no such truths. What is at stake 
is rather recontextualization, as Richard Rorty might like to say, 
locating an old, almost mythical question of judging Antigone’s 
reasons and Creon’s reasons within a new context imposed by the 
postmodern aura.
Let us begin with Le Différend, though. The book consists of 
264 philosophical fragments grouped in seven parts which cover 
the problematic of the différend, the referent and the Name, 
presentation, result (Résultat of thinking), obligation, genres and 
norms as well as the signs of history, interspersed with "dense" 
and extremely erudite commentaries (notices) which refer to 
Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato, Antistenes, Aristotle, together with 
Kant, Hegel and Levinas. Besides, a commentary is devoted to 
Gertrude Stein’s writings, another one to Declaration of 1789 and, 
finally, still another one to a tribe of Cashinahua Indians that 
appears in many Lyotard’s writings. The proper text is preceded 
by a text entitled Fiche de lecture -  a partially ironic, partially 
parodie "summary", so to speak, of the whole work which will allow 
the reader, "if the fancy grabs him or her, to ’talk about the book’ 
without having read i t " w i th in  an epoch one of chief features of 24
24 Jean-François Lyotard, Le Différend, Minuit 1983 (English translation by 
Georges Van Den Abbeele as The Différend. Phrases in Dispute, Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 1988, hereafter references will be included in the text as LD, 
followed either by a page number or a paragraph number; LD, p. 13.
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which is "gaining time". That dossier which precedes the proper 
philosophical notebook of sketches (which Le Différend 
undoubtedly is) in itself deserves a moment of our attention. It 
describes or explains e.g. the title of the book, its object, thesis, 
philosophical context, as well as its reader, presenting a parody of 
a certain style of reading (not only philosophy). The situation a 
reader faces is seemingly strange -  an author himself presents a 
(conceptual) summary of his book, so that a reader will know -  
with paralyzing certainty -  "what is at stake" in it. He will master 
the book intellectually even before he has actually approached it. 
So it may turn out that the very act of reading will become just a 
"waste of time" (Lyotard remarks sadly that "reflection is not thrust 
aside today because it is dangerous or upsetting, but simply 
because it is a waste of time. It is ’good for nothing’, it is not good 
for gaining time. For success is gaining time", LD, p. xv). Reading 
takes too much time if one can get the "contents" or the "message" 
of a book in the form of a ready extract.25 And yet -  as a reader 
should be "a philosophical one, that is, anybody" (LD, p. xiv) -  
Lyotard parodies such reading that performs merely a conceptual 
reduction, which reduces comprehension of a work to 
“possessing" its meaning. For reading (like judging) should be 
directed towards singularity of a text (of an event). Thus just as 
judging in Lyotard’s account assumes the anti-universalistic shape 
of judging a particular event on the basis of -  individual -  criteria 
forged for it, it may also be the case that reading is a process of 
listening to a text in search of its peculiarities, its uniqueness 
(precisely therefore this sensibilité à la singularité du cas,26 
sensibility to singularity of a case, is necessary) rather than a 
process of reducing a text to its "meaning" in familiar concepts.27 
And perhaps the Preface to The Différend is supposed to serve 
just this function of expressing Lyotard’s disgust with such reading
25 Bill Readings, Introducing Lyotard (London: Routledge, 1991), p. xix.
26 Jean-François Lyotard, Pérérgrinations. Loi, forme, événement (Editions 
Galilée, 1990), p. 26.
27 Bill Readings, Introducing Lyotard, p. xix. As it is worth while noting that it 
was already in La condition postmoderne that Lyotard wrote that "work and text 
have the characters of an event'. The Postmodern Condition (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 1984), p.81.
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of philosophical texts and to make us sensitive to quid (that 
something is happening) rather than to quod (what is happening). 
The introduction in inverted commas says that "the time has come 
to philosophize" -  to philosophize, let us add, without dreams of 
telos, without designing vast, utopian social "emancipatory" 
visions and, finally, to philosophize in narratives rather than in 
intellectual and abstract theories, to be "pagan", to "bear witness 
to différends" and to "save the honour of thinking" which, as he 
writes in his autobiographical Pérégrinations, requires "muchpo
subtlety ( finesse) in the perception of small differences".
Let us begin to approach the Lyotardian conception of a 
différend, partially quoting and partially paraphrazing some of the 
most important passages. Lyotard says at the very beginning that 
"as distinguished from a litigation, a différend would be a case of 
conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both 
arguments. One side’s legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack 
of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both 
in order to settle their différend as though it were merely a litigation 
would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if neither side 
admits this rule)" (LD, p. xi). A wrong that results in such a case 
comes from the fact that rules of the genre of discourse on the 
basis of which judging takes place are not rules of a genre or 
genres of discourse being judged. Thus a wrong -  to use Lyotard’s 
words -  is a "damage accompanied by the loss of means to prove 
the damage" (LD, 7). This is the case if the victim is deprived of 
life, of his or her liberties, of freedom to express public opinions or 
-  to put it in the simplest way -  when a sentence which bears 
witness to a wrong is (structurally) devoid of any meaning. In a 
word, a victim is deprived of the possibility to disclose his or her 
knowledge about a wrong to anyone else, including the tribunal 
before which it might be judged. The difference between a plaintiff 
and a victim is the following: a plaintiff is someone who has 
suffered damage and possesses means to prove it; he becomes 
a victim when presenting a wrong -  expressing suffering -  is 
impossible. The pair of plaintiff/litigation is symmetrical with the 
pair of victim/differend: a litigation becomes a différend when a 28
28 Jean-François Lyotard, Pérégrinations, p. 41.
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plaintiff is divested of the means to argue -  when he or she is 
forced to remain silent -  and becomes for that reason a victim (let 
us mention e.g. the case in which an author of damages is then a 
judge of them). "A case of a différend between parties takes place 
when the ’regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in 
the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other 
is not signified in that idiom", says Lyotard (LD, 12). To bear 
witness to a différend -  as this is as much as the philosopher can 
dare according to Lyotard -  is to create the possibility of expressing 
a wrong. What is needed is a new idiom, new "prudence" 
(phronesis). Philosophers, seeing that not everything can be held 
in sentences -  that certain sentences exceed the existing 
discourse, should "institute idioms which do notyet exist" (LD, 23). 
If a victim could phrase the wrong it suffers -  could present it to a 
tribunal to be judged -  he or she would merely be a plaintiff as 
there would be no structure within which he or she could be forced 
to keep silence. A paradigm of a victim is -  for obvious reasons -  
an animal.29
3.
The event (occurence, événement) is a radically singular 
occurrence which for this reason cannot be presented within a 
framework of some general narrative without the loss of its 
singularity.30 Writing after an event -  that is to say, linking phrases 
(phrases) to it, should express its singularity: Lyotard’s question
29 Richard Rorty wrote about the impossibility of existence of the "language 
of victims" -  of the idiom that Lyotard searches -  while analysing Orwell’s work 
in CIS. Rorty is obviously right if we take into consideration the time which 
accompanies victims’ wrong but he is wrong if we realize that a ’’victim himself" 
is not capable of phrasing his wrong. What is needed is an idiom to be forged 
later, a new representational framework in which (as in a new horizon of sense) 
a wrong will appear precisely as a wrong rather than as a damage. The Foucault 
-  Derrida conflict about the Madness and Civilisation was just about that: can 
one "give voice back to those deprived of it", without reinforcing the power of 
voice over silence, the power of rationality over madness. To give voice to 
madness itself makes the book "impossible”, as Derrida states in "Cogito and 
the History of Madness” (in Writing and Difference, Chicago: Chicago UP, 1978), 
as madness is /’absence de I’oeuvre.
30 As Bill Readings says about Auschwitz: "the event is the occurrence after 
which nothing will ever be the same again", op. cit., p. 57.
appearing throughout the book about the différend is that of 
Theodor W. Adorno: "how to philosophize ’after Auschwitz’?" and 
he gives it a new meaning -  namely, how to responsibly 
(ethically?) link phrases about unpresentable horror of the death 
camp without presenting this horror at the same time? Other 
events which are often "signs of history" are, for instance, the 
French Revolution (whose significance as Begebenheit Kant 
immediately perceived in his The Conflict of the Faculties) or May 
’68, and looking back towards more distant past -  let us add from 
ourselves as that will be necessary for a further analysis -  gradual 
separation of ethics and politics in the times of, as Hegel puts it 
summarily in Phenomenology, "stoicism, scepticism and the 
unhappy consciousness".
Antigone and Creon were literary witnesses of this Lyotardian 
in spirit (although, as a matter of fact, imposed upon him by the 
author of the present essay, which is worth being kept in mind) 
événement. On the one side in this conflict there is the "law of 
shadows"- relentless necessity to bury brother’s body, on the other 
side there is the law of a "bright day" (as Hegel calls them)31 32which 
does not allow to entomb a traitor. In Antigone there is a clash of 
two orders -that of a family, of blood ties and obligations of kinship, 
and that of a citizen. Divine law is not commensurable with human 
law. Hegel says that an "acting consciousness can negate neither 
that it has committed a crime, nor can it negate its fault". The 
situation of Antigone is "a tragic collision between a duty and 
lawless reality".
There is no possibility of finding a common language, Antigone 
and Creon seem not so much to be in an opposition as rather to 
be incommensurably, radically different because they express two 
different worlds: a primitive world of ethical unity and a new world 
of separated ethics and politics. Their linguistic games remain
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31 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, vol. II, the analysis from the 
chapter "True Mind. Objective Ethics (Sittlichkeit)" (in the Polish translation pp. 
5-52).
32 It is one of many possible interpretations of Antigone, worth mentioning at 
least due to its persistent presence in the culture of modern Europe. Antigone -  
like sophists and Socrates -  witnesses the destruction of the ancient polis, the 
disintegration of the Aristotelian household (oikos) into morality on the one hand 
and the Roman law on the other. The two aspects of the disintegration in question
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mutually untranslatable, there is no possibility of finding common 
criteria of judgement which could be accepted by both sides of that 
differend. The acceptance of a perspective (language -  criteria -  
laws) of one of the sides irresistibly gives birth to a wrong on the 
other side, as we know from Lyotard’s analyses. It is a differend 
of opposite reasons every one of which -  within a framework of its 
own linguistic game -  would be an acceptable reason. But united 
together in the figures of Antigone, they begin a deadly 
differend.33
The tragic which appears -  excellently perceived and exposed 
by Hegel -  consists in both Creon’s and Antigone’s being right. 
There is no good way out of thereby created differend: Antigone’s 
wrong is accompanied by the said lack of means to prove it (in 
Creon’s world of separated ethical and political orders, of a private 
sphere separated from public space), whereas in an opposite case 
a violation of public sphere (unavenged treason, a posthumous 
fate of a traitor of homeland being the same as that of its defender) 
would require to be phrased and actually could not be presented 
in an incommensurable world of blood ties in which -  still -  
Antigone lives.
It seems to be a classical case of a differend (rather than a 
litigation) in Lyotard’s sense of the term. Why would not it be a 
litigation? Because there is no common discourse, even common 
"we" shared by both sides. There is no instance judging "reasons"
are dealt with in two Hegelian masterpieces: Phenomenology of Mind and 
Philosophy of Right. When the split of ethics and politics was started in stoicism, 
at the same time man ceased to be only a citizen, he started to belong to two 
orders, a moral and a political one. It was for the first time in human history that 
"private man opposes particularities of his own needs to common life, society 
and the state" (p. 63). The Roman citizen no longer fights -  he has to work for 
himself as a private owner, for money and property. Instead of "constantly waging 
prestigious wars" (i.e. wars for respect), as Alexandre Kojeve says, he for the 
first time becomes an individual, accepting simultaneously ideologies of his 
slaves -  stoicism, scepticism and Christianity. On the radical split between ethics 
and politics in stoicism see J.-M. Palmier, Hegel (Editions Universitaire, Paris 
1968), pp. 59-63; Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 
157-161 and A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1968).
33 For us today it is a "conflict of values", while Antigone at her time was 
certain of being "totally right", says Charles Taylor, p. 175.
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of both sides acceptable by them. The conflict cannot be resolved 
without making use of the language (the whole world) of one of the 
two sides, and it is for this reason that it is not a case of a litigation. 
What is needed for a litigation is just a code, laws, judges -  and 
an accepted (be it even after making an appeal) sentence. In the 
case of a différend there is no such a possibility. Choosing the 
universe of one of the sides, we are "doing wrong" to the other 
one, we deprive it of the right of defence in a neutral vocabulary 
of an uncommitted judge.
Antigone and Creon speak radically different languages and 
their conflict of reasons cannot be expressed in any of them without 
doing "injustice", without prejudging, by means of the idiom used, 
which of the two sides is "right". (Either we speak the language of 
a premodern unsocialized world -  and then Creon turns out to be 
a tyrant who illogically insists on an incomprehensible law, or we 
speak the language of a modern, i.e. socialized world in which 
Antigone, let us beg the reader’s pardon in advance, turns out to 
be a hysterical neurotic, additionally driven by the will to death).
Let us stop for a while by certain classical accounts of the tragic. 
Max Scheler, for instance, as his commentators stress, assumed 
as the first after Aristotle that the tragic is a category of life rather 
than of art - that is to say, that it is aesthetic rather than ethical (He 
said: "the tragic is rather an element of life itself"34). So in order to 
be able to talk about the possibility of a "tragic différend" in Lyotard, 
we have to first follow Scheler’s paths of understanding the tragic 
- as the Aristotelian definition saying that the tragic is what "bears 
compassion and fear" will not be of any use for us here. In the most 
general terms, a tragic world, according to Scheler, requires 
values because: "In the world deprived of values ... there is no 
tragedy".35 Only such a conflict can be tragic which arises between 
subjects possessing some high positive value -  for instance 
between highly ethical individuals. Not only both sides of the 
conflict "are right", but also each of the individuals taking part in it 
"represents equally sublime law -  as he says -  or seems to have 
and to fulfil equally sublime duty". In everything that is tragic there
34 Max Scheler, "On the Phenomenon of the Tragic", Lwów, 1938, p. 51.
35 Ibidem, p. 58.
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is necessity and unavoidabilityot the destruction of values. (It is 
therefore, let us add, that the "différend" between Antigone and 
Creon is tragic in the sense suggested here, but a classical 
example of différend shown by Lyotard, Auschwitz, is not tragic 
unless in the abandoned by us sense of the Aristotelian katharsis, 
compassion and fear). There is also no tragedy in the case when 
one is capable of answering clearly the question: "who is to be 
blamed?". What belongs both to the essence of the Lyotardian 
différend, as well as to the essence of tragic conflict in Max 
Scheler’s account is that "even an ideal, the wisest and the most 
just judge is not able to soften or heal it". Since what the Lyotardian 
judge lacks are universal criteria, he still has to forge them for a 
particular case. Just as in Scheler’s view a conflict which can still 
be ethically or legally solved is not tragic, in Lyotard’s view the 
conflict at stake would not be a différend, but merely a litigation. 
Let us also add here that Scheler to a large extent bases his 
analysis of the phenomenon of the tragic on the classical Hegel’s 
intuitions. Although the name of the latter, just as these of Antigone 
and Socrates, does not occur in his study, nevertheless one can 
feel all the time while reading it a subterraneous, unrevealing 
course of the Hegelian reflection.
We can say that our world -  postmodern world -  still looks at 
Antigone with the eyes (and analyzes with the language) of Creon. 
Thus to apply our criteria -  just like to apply his criteria -  would 
make Antigone a Lyotardian "victim" (as she would not have any 
possibility of demonstrating her wrong which is incomprehensible 
and reasonably inexpressible out of the context of the idiom of 
ancient myths about Hades and obligations of blood). To apply 
them would bear injustice.
So we might be allowed to look at this classical conflict with 
different eyes (which, obviously, do not exist, and which is 
precisely why différends remain for ever unsolvable) -  not in order 
to resolve them but to add our thoughts about these times -  to link 
our sentences (phrases) to the existing ones, to think after 
Sophocles and after Lyotard -  forming and idiom which would 
"save the honour of thinking", as the latter puts it. As what is at 
stake is to phrase or express a différend rather than to resolve it 
because a différend -  contrary to a litigation -  must remain open.
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Its solution transforms a différend into a mere litigation, depriving 
it of its specific character. When a différend becomes a litigation, 
one of the sides (and sometimes two of them, or all of them) 
becomes a victim. Its wrong cannot be expressed, put in phrases, 
it subsides into silence. Lyotard does not identify himself with an 
(ideological, theoretical and always conceptualizing) "intellectual", 
perhaps best descried in his Tombeau de l’intellectuel et autres 
papiers: he is a "philosopher" whose "responsibility before thought 
-  as he says -  consists... in detecting différends and in finding the 
(impossible) idiom for phrasing them" (LD, p.142). The intellectual 
smoothes a violent surface of social life, helps to forget about the 
existence of différends, first transforming them into litigations and 
then resolving.
4.
A différend always occurs between two (incommensurable) 
language games, two little narratives -  as what results from 
incommensurability, a radical difference, is the impossibility to find 
and to apply common criteria to pass a judgement. The existing 
criteria, well settled, fixed and obligatory representational 
frameworks do not suffice to judge a difference unless one wants 
to reduce or repress it, annihilate it, make it keep silent. The 
difference at stake -  a différend -  cannot be phrased at a given 
moment. It is only later, within a framework of new representational 
rules, that one can try to show it in a new idiom formed particularly 
for that case Gust as the singularity of Auschwitz disappears the 
moment it is not regarded -  following Adorno -  as a breach in a 
speculative discourse of reality and rationality: it is then merely 
one among many atrocities).
In Lyotard’s view the task of art, philosophy or aesthetics in our 
(post-metaphysical and post-metanarrative) postmodern epoch is, 
as a matter of fact, detecting, bringing to light and bearing witness 
to all différends with one aim: to resist injustice which "deprives of 
voice those who cannot speak the language of the master".36
36 As Readings puts it in op.cit, p. xxx.
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Antigone is bound to lose (although it is worth bearing in mind 
that the chorus takes her side in the play). Her world no longer 
exists. A homogeneous unity of the private and the public, of the 
man and the citizen, is already a thing of a past. The "differend" 
finds here no other solution than a tragic one. Oedipus’ daughter 
is not able to prove that her conduct is right; in a new world of split 
obligations it is Creon who has a reason, evidence before a 
possible tribunal and, finally, power at his disposal. It is Creon who 
-  let us add -  neither is a tyrant nor destroys a weak individual in 
the name of utopian reasons or pathological ambitions, but who is 
just a legalist in the world of politics. Although in the end he gives 
up and changes his mind (not without the influence of Teiresias’ 
prophecies), it is too late anyway. The last act of the tragedy is 
completed. As the mechanism of "wrong" has been set in motion. 
The tragic event, death, happens. We feel compassion for 
Antigone but also Creon is not a less tragic, not a less split hero.
It is another time that the two orders (Lyotard would say: genres 
of a discourse) that have just been separated from each other: 
ethics and politics, turn out to be incommensurable, take opposite 
sides after the destruction of o/'/cos; one has to bear in mind, at the 
same time, that every attempt to unite them once again -  when 
"power" belongs to "virtue", as Hegel says in Phenomenology, as 
Jacobeans and Bolsheviks had wanted -  gives birth to terror (and 
then heads go down like "cabbage-heads"). It looked some time 
ago as if philosophy might be an adjucating tribunal in controversial 
cases. Today it is a more and more common view that also 
philosophy is just one of genres of a discourse, a philosopher being 
merely "a kind of writer" (and philosophy being "a kind of writing", 
as Rorty once provocatively wrote).
The conflict of Antigone’s and Creon’s opposite reasons 
becomes in our account a "differend" of incommensurable orders. 
Could one say -  non-historically, so to speak -  who "was right" in 
the differend? One could not do that, I suppose, without privileging 
one of the sides, that is to say, without doing wrong to the other. 
The classical opposition: either Antigone, or Creon, either 
obligations of blood, or public obligations, cannot be maintained 
(as we leave aside here the interpretation starting from the choice 
made by Antigone herself, at stake being placing of two worlds
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side by side rather than dealing with the psychology of the 
heroine). Is there a good "resolution" from such a perspective?
Perhaps one could "write narratives", "build micrologies" after 
what had happened in Antigone. Lyotard says: "let us wage a war 
on totality", "let us activate differends" -  not so that we could 
confront an old totality with a new one or so that we could "resolve" 
differends (unsolvable without a "wrong"), but so that we could 
know something new, say something which cannot be phrased in 
the case of a homogeneous paradigm of the human nature. 
Perhaps the following could be stated: it is impossible to adjudicate 
Creon’s "reasons" and Antigone’s "reasons" within a classical 
account of the humanistic whole which bears the collective name 
of "man". Creon and Antigone -  pushing the differences between 
them to perhaps grotesque extremities -  come from different 
cultures, different worlds which remain "impenetrable" to each 
other (i.e. they do not share much in common as "people"). There 
is not any God’s eye view which would allow a super-cultural 
analysis and super-cultural adjudication of both "reasons". There 
is no cultural translation.37 Cultural differences cannot be 
abandoned in some "objective" gaze of the uncommitted 
researcher or judge. The world of Antigone, her culture (like 
pre-Socratic world and culture) do not exist, just as they did not 
exist in the literary space governed by Creon. Although they did 
share a common (Greek) language, the universes built upon it 
were incom m ensurab le  and un trans la tab le , m utua lly  
incommunicable. Antigone was right in her own world, Creon was
37 A similar argumentative course is taken by Bill Readings somewhere else 
-  in his analysis of Werner Herzog’s film "Where Green Ants Dream": for 
Aborigines from whom the Whites want to buy land the place at stake is a wholly 
one. The formers’ language in untranslatable in the language of the court, 
heterogeneous with respect to the language of law. Their identity as "men" would 
be imposed on them (See "Pagans, Perverts or Primitives? Experimental Justice 
in the Empire of Capital" in: Judging Lyotard, ed. A. Benjamin, London: 
Routledge, 1992). There is no common, shared "human nature" -  says Rorty in 
CIS, personality being a “web of contingent beliefs and desires". There is no 
common "we” for Antigone and for Creon, just as there is no common "we” for 
Aborigines and Westerners (Readings), Cashinahua Indians and Europeans 
(Lyotard) or Serbs and Americans (Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality 
and Sentimentality", typescript).
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right in his own. But none of them could rely upon a just judgement 
of a super-cultural judge. Their "différend" could be resolved by 
Gods only, man entangled in his culture -  in Antigone 
paradoxically still coexisting in the same time and in the same 
place -  could not do that. The world of the "divine law" and that of 
the "human law" according to Hegel’s Phenomenologyare the two 
worlds of two different (contradictory) forms of objective ethics 
(Sittlichkeit): a family and the state. To follow the duties of one law 
results in the revenge of the other law. The other, opposite ethical 
power brings about destruction. In le différend from Sophocle’s 
Antigone a pre-modern or ancient world and a modern world face 
each other, two different ethical orders confront each other, one 
of them basing itself on irrational power of kinship, the other on 
newly opened political space. Neither Creon nor Antigone could 
surrender -  they acted within frameworks of rationalities of their 
own worlds.
5.
It is also the death of Socrates that Hegel describes in a similar 
tone. Death in the sense that someone is dying is not tragic in his 
view, it can be merely sad. Real tragedy occurs only -  he explains 
- where there are ethical forces on both sides and they collide with 
each other. In Socrates’ fate the tragedy of Athens, the tragedy of 
Greece were exposed. We have here two forces which confront 
each other. One of them is the divine law, a naive, traditional 
custom. The other principle is an equally divine law of 
consciousness, the right of knowledge (of subjective freedom); it 
is the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, i.e. reason. 
These two principles clashed in Socrates’ life and philosophy. Let 
us add to that the Hegelian saying from his Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy that "tragedies in which tyrants and innocent men 
play are flat, they are empty and irrational to a highest degree. The 
great man wants to be guilty, he takes up a great conflict". Antigone 
frightens us with her drive to death much more than rational 
Socrates does. It seems to me that while Socrates had to die 
because the world of Ancient Greece could not tolerate a 
subjective will to knowledge yet, Antigone meets her failure
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because modern world of split ethics and politics could no longer 
tolerate a subjective will to live in that old world which Hegel used 
to call a "political world of art" and which had just collapsed. And 
just as it was Athenians’ duty to condemn Socrates, it was also 
Creon’s duty to condemn Antigone. They both resist the existing 
order; Socrates in the name of (still unrecognized by Athenian 
prosecutors) future, Antigone -  in the name of (scarcely buried) 
past. Socrates wished individual freedom, freedom of an individual 
who would not be saturated with the state -  he put morality before 
objective ethics (Sittlichkeit) and he was bound to lose. Antigone 
wished the right to close a human being in (no longer available) 
totality of man-citizen. They are both innocent, but nevertheless 
so guilty in their innocence. Innocent expressing a yet 
undiscovered (Socrates) or an already rejected (Antigone) 
principle, guilty -  destroying the only principles existing. The 
conflict of misunderstood by their own time figures of Antigone and 
Socrates has much in common with le différend.
Max Scheler discussing the "tragedy of a noble man" once 
again reaches for a figure of Socrates, or rather to such an image 
of him that had been formed by Hegelian analyses. And although 
neither of the names is mentioned there, it seems that behind the 
generalization in question is precisely that Hegel’s example. Thus 
"’a noble man’ -  Scheler says -  has to break ’moral law’ or 
whatever can be a ’commandment’ in the domain of morality. 
Actually without guilt, he necessarily has to appear to be ’guilty’". 
At the same time a crowd of prosecutors "with clear conscience" 
fulfils their "bounden duty". The tragic is born from the fact that 
prosecutors cannot be condemned on "ethical" grounds. A tragic 
hero does not have to differfrom a criminal in the eyes of his epoch. 
Moreover, he may even die as a criminal... Let us quote here in 
exfensothat moving passage: "A tragic man steps his way among 
his ’contemporaries’ calmly and without renown. He walks around 
unrecognized by the crowd; if he is not seen by people as a 
criminal. Lack of an Instance which would draw a distinction 
between the former and the latter is not here casual, but 
necessary"-38 We can do justice to a tragic, lonely hero only in a
38 Max Scheler, p. 90, 91 -  emphasis mine.
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different epoch -  just like in the case of idioms coined by Lyotard 
which "save (often after a long time) the honour of thinking". At 
present that "lack of an instance" is exactly "necessary" -  a 
judgement devoid of a "wrong" will be passed only by the future. 
A tragic hero is not to be blamed for his "guilt", he is caught in it, 
says Scheler. It is guilt that comes to him, not the reverse. Antigone 
and Socrates are tragic with a different kind of the tragic...
Both Antigone and Socrates suffer wrong in the Lyotardian 
sense of the term. But in the existing (and obligatory) language 
their wrong cannot be phrased. The Athenian prosecutors, 
similarly to Creon, act in a just manner in every respect. Socrates’ 
too early language game as well as Antigone's too late language 
game are reduced to s ilence , rem ain un rea lized , 
incomprehensible. The two heroes do not appear in the times 
proper to them. Socrates and Athenians, Antigone and Creon - 
these are differends between one law and another law, each of 
them being precisely a law rather than lawlessness (and therefore 
their individual fate is a tragic one). Hegel says about Socrates 
that he is a "hero who consciously recognized and expressed a 
higher principle of spirit", that yet unaccented individuality. 
Antigone, on the other hand, was late with her law, she expressed 
the principle which had just been overcome by the constantly 
changing world. While Socrates was a "historical hero" who was 
defeated as an individual but the principle discovered by whom 
succeeded -  because it was used by the "cunning of reason", 
Antigone was merely "manure" of history... She was not given a 
posthumous satisfaction that Socrates was given, her death was 
a death in vain, a death that could not change the course of history 
(although it still was an example of Belle mort, beautiful death, 
which was later refused to prisoners in Auschwitz dying -  as
qq
Adorno wrote -  "as specimens". 39
39 Theodor W. Adorno said in Negative Dialectics: “The fact that in death 
camps died the specimen rather than the individual cannot not pertain to dying 
of those who have avoided these administrative means" (Polish translation, p. 
508). It is from here that the Adornian "drastic guilt of the saved" comes...
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6 .
The Lyotardian conception of the differend allows one to take 
into consideration the question of an entanglement of two orders: 
private and public, in all its dramaticality and irresolvability. The 
solution put forward by Richard Rorty -  strangeness of "solidarity" 
and "self-creation", their "incommensurability" -  makes disappear 
the aura of tragedy which accompanies human choices from the 
highest existential registers (one could simply ask whether it is not 
the case that he "flattens" in his conception what cannot be 
"de-dramatized" if only tragedy should be inscribed in human fate). 
What Rorty would suggest? How would he solve our conflict of 
tragic reasons -  perhaps he might take the course of avoiding it 
as one of those age-old and never-solvable perennial problems of 
philosophy? In other words, can a self-creating, Rortyan "liberal 
ironist" be a tragic figure in the sense given to the term here or 
perhaps the tragedy has been taken away from him with a radical 
pragmatic gesture? Can fantasies, idiosyncrasies, singular and 
unique -  Lyotard’s singulier- philosophical idioms (as Rorty would 
like to see Derrida from La carte postale, Limited Inc. and G/as40) 
ever lead to a situation of the tragic, existential choice? It seems 
to us that the answer has to be in the negative as dramatic Pascal’s 
struggles from Thoughts, Kierkegaard’s from Fear and Trembling, 
not to mention Nietzsche, Shestov or Camus, cannot be heard in 
Rorty. Tragedy -  inscribed in the human condition by 
"existentialist", to use the broadest term, thinking -  seems to be
40 The most fervent defender of Derrida against his "pramaticization" by Rorty 
is probably Christopher Norris: starting with arguments of the kind of -  "Rorty 
has no time for Derrida’s more detailed or complex passages of textual 
argumentation" (in Derrida, Harvard UP, 1989, p.150), through a sophisticated 
argumentation that it is precisely Rorty who is responsible for and lies at the basis 
of Habermas’ misunderstanding of Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity ("Deconstruction, Postmodernism and Philosophy” in: Derrida: A 
Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell 1992, pp. 171-3) to his continuous philippics 
in almost every essay from What's Wrong with Postmodernism (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1990). A question appears whether Norris is not such a 
"authorized depository of truth" about Derrida as Searle is of Austin -  which 
Derrida so masterfully deconstructs in Limited Inc. a b c... (Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, 1988, pp. 29-110).
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absent there.41 42While Lyotard had in mind detecting différends, 
Rorty in a polemics with him in Philosophical Papers would like to 
repress them, to replace différends with litigations, according to a 
more general idea of replacing force with persuasion. But that 
seems to be an option of political liberalism rather than a 
philosophical choice -  an example of this title "priority of
40
democracy to philosophy" in another essay
Thus the question asked at the beginning whether 
postmodernism in philosophy really deprives human fate, culture, 
world - of the tragic, the dramatic, apocalypticism, ability to choose 
or just, as Zygmunt Bauman wants somewhere else, bears 
"existential insecurity -  ontological contingency of being"43 -  
divides in a multitude of questions, as many of them, to be exact, 
as many there are these "postmodernisms". It seems to be 
problematic whether in Rorty’s world of "contingency" there is 
some room left for the drama of human fate. It seems possible to 
solve (overcome, avoid, repress) most contradictions according to 
him, to flatten the tragic of existential conflicts of reasons, take 
away from drama its horror, in a word -  to "de-dramatize the 
world". But in Lyotard that is not the case, at least in Lyotard of his 
conception of le différend 44
41 The significance of the private-public distinction in Rorty’s philosophy is 
testified e.g. by his (as autobiographical as Pérégrinations... for Lyotard) text 
"Trotsky and the Wild Orchids". It was only after forty years of struggles -  in 
Contingency... -  that he realized that the two perspectives: that of solidarity and 
that of self-creation, cannot be united: it is impossible to unite "Trotsky" ("fight 
with social injustice") with "wild orchids" ("socially useless flowers"). Rorty says 
that it was only when he was writing Contingency... that he solved the problem: 
"[T]here is no need to weave one’s personal equivalent of Trotsky and one’s 
personal equivalent of my wild orchids together. Rather, one should try to abjure 
the temptation to tie one’s moral responsibilities to other people with one’s 
relations to whatever idiosyncratic things or persons one is obsessed with" 
(P-147).
42 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism Without Emancipation” in PP 1, pp. 217, 
218.
43 See Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Introduction.
44 It is worth adding that also Michel Foucault "de-dramatizes" the modern 
world when in Surveiller et punir he shows the point of transition from the theatre 
of pain (how difficult it is to forget the opening scenes from the book!) to the 
theatre of surveillance, punishment, in a word - to Panopticon. Neither power nor
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One could also ask the question whether the effect of a 
differend -  a wrong -  is always tragic? Not necessarily, it seems. 
If we assumed that a tragic conflict of reasons is such one in which 
both reasons are morally right and one of them has to give up, it 
would turn out that if a victim could simply become a plaintiff before 
some tribunal, the element of tragedy would disappear 
immediately. And a tribunal to judge a wrong in Lyotard’s sense of 
the word does not exist -  in a paradigmatically binding picture of 
the world a wrong can be neither phrased, nor represented. A 
wrong is only looking for new forms of expression. Lyotard says 
that in order for the wrong to find an expression and for the plaintiff 
to cease being a victim philosophizing (always in experimental, 
judging coup par coup, case by case, respecting singularity of an 
event way) has to search for "new rules for the formation and 
linking of phrases... anew competence (or’prudence’)" (LD, p.13). 
The differend is such a situation in language when something that 
ought to be phrased in it -  that begs for being phrased -  cannot 
be phrased. At least -  cannot be phrased immediately, within 
existing representational frameworks and according to binding 
criteria. It is therefore, let us add, that Lyotardian justice is neither 
a discovered norm or an invented one, but always a horizon out 
of our reach. Each judgement passed without a criterion -  which 
has been known at least since Aristotle and his judge guided by 
his phronesis -m ust assume that it will be judged itself. And then 
next judgement, and then next once again, and so ad infinitum.45 
The Lyotardian account of justice does not tell us how to judge, it 
merely makes us sensitive to unavoidable necessity of judging 
itself (ethical necessity, let us make it clear). Judging in the form 
of linking (adding) phrases to existing ones is necessary though
resistance to it are dramatic -  power penetrates everything as it is 
"capillary", while resistance to it is hopeless, for which Foucault is even today 
often reproached (see e.g. quite a representative criticism by Edward Said in 
"Criticism and the Imagination of Power" dealing with the paradox that is born 
when one realizes that Foucault’s analyses of power detect its injustice and 
cruelty, while his theoretizations demonstrate unavoidably of presence of such 
power, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Hoy, Oxford: Blackwell 1986).
4S See Jean-Francois Lyotard (with J.L. Thebaud), Just Gaming, trans. Wlad 
Godzich (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1985), pp. 25-29.
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contingent -  Lyotard says the following: "It is necessary to link, but 
the mode of linkage is never necessary" (LD, 41). If there occurs 
an event, a previously existing representational framework is 
destroyed, so for this event to be judged one has to find a peculiar, 
singular idiom precisely for this case. In the case of language 
games "justice" would equal resistance to the situation in which a 
certain game becomes a meta-game, a meta-language, providing 
rules and criteria to other games. The meta-game most attacked 
by Lyotard is that of cognitive rules to which other, heterogeneous 
and irreducible games of ethics, politics or aesthetics are reduced 
(which always gives birth to the differend). It is also sometimes the 
case that politics becomes an existing meta-game -  especially 
with respect to ethics or aesthetics. Perhaps it might be said that 
the only acceptable case in which heteronomity of language 
games could be broken is the case of the "wrong" -  and simply 
transcendental hegemony of duties, obligations, in a word -  of 
ethics. But that is a story to be told in another micrology...
There may arise here the following question: why in this 
philosophical excursus did I decide to give voice to Lyotard for 
such a long time? I did it in order to present briefly another, 
incommensurable vision of philosophy and philosopher, of their 
past, present and future. Rorty is a strongly "reactive" philosopher 
-  in the sense of reacting to others’ philosophy. He possesses an 
exceptional and unique talent of coining his own philosophy mainly 
in confrontation with other philosophers -  with Habermas, Derrida, 
Foucault, Lyotard (apart from Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein or 
Nietzsche from among more distant figures). Who, as a matter of 
fact, said the following, asked about what philosophy was, if not 
Rorty:
The reason I write philosophical books is all the other 
books I have read, and my reaction to those books. I 
react to some books and not to others.46
Lyotard’s book about the differend gave rise to many serious 
generalizations about recent French philosophy; it gave rise to
46 Richard Rorty in a conversation with Giovanna Borradori, The American 
Philosopher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 117.
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comparisons, to another traversée de l ’Atlantique, as we can say 
following Vincent Descombes, this time looking for one’s identity 
in confrontation with Lyotard’s thought. Each Rorty’s confrontation 
with European philosophy is extremely stimulating to him. While 
in philosophical reports from his confrontations with Derrida, 
Habermas or Foucault we gave incomparably more possibility of 
expressing his voice to Rorty, here we decided to allow Lyotard to 
present his case (although in our own redescription) more fully. It 
seems to us that such a European context will turn out to be useful 
for the book.47
47 I want to express my deep gratitude for Professor Anna 
Zeidler-Janiszewska for a number of inspiring suggestions made after reading 
the draft version of the present chapter. The chapter would have never been 
written without the stimulation of Professor Marek J. Siemek’s years-long lectures 
and seminars. I owe my fascination with Hegel and Plato to him.
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